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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 20-2414

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
ROMAR WATTS,
Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 2-16-cr-00009-002)
District Judge: Honorable Arthur J. Schwab
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
on June 3, 2021
Before: AMBRO, HARDIMAN, and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: June 9, 2021)

OPINION *

AMBRO, Circuit Judge
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

*

Appellant Romar Watts seeks our review of the District Court’s denial of his motion
for compassionate release. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the District Court’s
decision.
I.
In 2016, Watts was indicted for his role in a conspiracy to traffic large amounts of
heroin and fentanyl. He later pled guilty to a conspiracy charge and admitted to being
responsible for between 400 and 700 grams of heroin and between 8 and 16 grams of
fentanyl. As part of the plea agreement, Watts acknowledged his responsibility for the
deaths of two individuals who had fatally overdosed on drugs he supplied. He was
sentenced to 108 months’ imprisonment and 8 years of supervised release.
Watts later moved for compassionate release in response to the COVID-19
pandemic. He argued he was at higher risk of serious disease because he has asthma, high
cholesterol, and pre-diabetes. The District Court denied Watts’s motion. The Court first
held that Watts had not sufficiently exhausted his administrative remedies as to his motion
for compassionate release. The Court further held that Watts had not shown extraordinary
and compelling circumstances warranting release—and even if he had, the Court concluded
that the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) weighed against release. Watts now
appeals to us. 1

We have subject-matter jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and appellate jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
2
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II.
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1) provides that a court “may reduce” a defendant’s term of
imprisonment if, among other things, “extraordinary and compelling reasons” justify the
reduction in light of the § 3553(a) sentencing factors. Here, even assuming Watts has
demonstrated extraordinary and compelling reasons for modification, the § 3553(a)
sentencing factors weigh against a reduction in his sentence. 2 We therefore discern no
error in the District Court’s decision.
A.

Extraordinary and Compelling Circumstances

Watts first argues that the District Court erred in concluding that he did not show
extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction. In light of his various
physical ailments, we assume without deciding that he has shown extraordinary and
compelling circumstances.
B.

Section 3553(a) Sentencing Factors

The § 3553(a) factors, however, weigh against Watts’s release and provide an
independent ground for affirmance. 3

We review the District Court’s determination

We assume for the sake of argument that Watts exhausted his administrative remedies, as
the § 3553(a) analysis is dispositive here.
3
The sentencing factors are: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history
and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence imposed (a) to reflect the
seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment
for the offense, (b) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, (c) to protect the
public from further crimes of the defendant, and (d) to provide the defendant with needed
training, care, or treatment in the most effective manner; (3) the kinds of sentences
available; (4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for the category
of offense and defendant in the Sentencing Guidelines; (5) any pertinent policy statement
by the Sentencing Commission; (6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities
among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
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concerning the factors for abuse of discretion. United States v. Pawlowski, 967 F.3d 327,
330 (3d Cir. 2020).
The District Court held that the § 3553(a) factors weighed against release in part
because Watts was responsible for large amounts of drugs and the deaths of two people. It
reasoned that “the nature, circumstances, and seriousness of this crime, and the need for
just punishment for it[,] are such that [Watts’s] release would not be justified.” App. vol.
I at 12. Watts also has a long and concerning criminal history that includes “drug
trafficking, illegal possession of a firearm, corruption of minors, and making a terroristic
threat (to a law enforcement officer).” Id. The Court reasoned that Watts’s history, along
with the drug infraction he committed during his incarceration, weighed against
compassionate release.
We cannot conclude that the Court abused its discretion. Watts’s crime was indeed
serious, as reflected by his initial sentence. And this is not Watts’s first drug-trafficking
offense, a concern that is compounded by his later drug infraction in prison. Further, Watts
had only served roughly half his sentence at the time the District Court considered his
motion. See id. at 2 (noting that Watts had served 53 months out of 108 in June 2020).
Under these facts, which Watts does not meaningfully contest, the District Court did not
abuse its discretion in concluding that the § 3553(a) factors weigh against his release.
*

*

*

*

*

For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the District Court.
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